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OPERATION PHAKISA: REFLECTIONS 





Operation Phakisa enjoys ‘presidential’ status as a project launched by and housed 
within the Presidency of the Republic of South Africa during the Zuma administration. 
Phakisa is a most ambitious project, which includes a prominent maritime component. 
The maritime focus functions as one catalyst for positioning South Africa as an inter-
national maritime player by 2030 and in the process speeding up national development 
through delivery of public goods, economic growth and jobs. Aiming to be an interna-
tional maritime player supposes that foreign policy elements also feature in the project 
considerations. Launched in 2014, Phakisa’s oceans leg now offers scope for scrutiny 
as mixed messages about its progress and failures routinely appear. The gist of the dis-
cussion is forward-looking, with Operation Phakisa’s progress, failures and prospects 
to achieve government’s 2030 maritime aims and objectives constituting the focus of 
the discussion. The study on which this article is based, found that Operation Phakisa’s 
oceans leg depicts an impressive government ambition to exploit a new frontier, one 
reflecting progress and failures with promises of rapid big results being the most visible 
failure. 
Introduction
New resource frontiers drew attention as growing demands for resources rose along-
side enabling technologies to unlock demanding, but rich resource landscapes. Africa 
features prominently in the global resource debate, and its oceans form a major resource 
frontier within ongoing deliberations on exploring opportunities and promoting the blue 
economy. 1The oceans focus did not escape South African attention in the country’s 
search for ways to boost a lethargic economy and shrink the growing void between 
promised and real service delivery. Hovering between the largest and second largest 
economy in Africa, adding a thriving oceans economy to South Africa’s economic clout 
augurs well for the country’s international, continental and national standing and a path-
way for mitigating its growing economic woes.2 
The ocean’s economy hub of Operation Phakisa aligns with implementing South 
Africa’s National Development Plan (NDP), and serves as an operational outlet for 
ways and means to access the country’s oceans as a national resource.3 According to the 
official Phakisa webpage: 
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Operation Phakisa is an initiative of the South African government. 
This initiative was designed to fast track the implementation of solu-
tions on critical development issues. This is a unique initiative to ad-
dress issues highlighted in the NDP 2030 such as poverty, unemploy-
ment and inequality. 
The oceans sector of Operation Phakisa termed ‘Unlocking the economic potential 
of South Africa’s oceans’ features alongside parallel initiatives to improve service deliv-
ery and speed up outputs to address societal needs, but one calling for real delivery and 
accountability. An Ocean Economy Lab supports the oceans focus of Phakisa to deliver 
on a range of maritime and marine-related sectors to support objectives of the NDP. 
Keeping in step with the Vision 2030 Summit and the NDP, South Africa’s maritime 
road map envisages a future where “South Africa is globally recognised as a maritime 
nation” by 2030.4 The oceans leg of Operation Phakisa serves as a primary programme 
in pursuit of the said vision. Since its presidential launch in 2014, Phakisa’s oceans proj-
ect received its fair share of attention, criticism, complements and scrutiny, and entering 
year five in 2019, a review of progress and stasis is in order.
The following discussion draws on open literature, government reports and Phaki-
sa-related websites, and proceeds along three themes covering the wider oceans debate 
and Operation Phakisa’s oceans leg in particular. First, and in order to set Phakisa within 
the international oceans debate, the discussion reviews rising interests in the general 
oceans economy and the blue economy debate. Second, an outline of the objectives 
and expectations underlying Phakisa’s oceans sector sets the scene for an assessment 
of Phakisa in 2019. The focus is on its marine sectors, how these support the drive for 
a blue economy, and matters of security as a basis for pursuing an ambitious maritime 
agenda. Third, some indicators on difficulties and shortcomings as well as progress are 
tendered before concluding with ideas on the way forward.
Rising interests in the oceans economy
The use of oceans in the pursuit of political, economic and social agendas reflects 
a history only second to that on land. Such use unfortunately entails a destructive side 
as well and one that coexists with drives and debates to utilise the oceans more re-
sponsibly. The twenty-first century brought renewed emphasis to the responsible use of 
ocean territories to unlock the overall economic potential tied up in the seas. Both the 
responsibility narrative as well as the opposing rights-based approach of unlimited use 
of the oceans now features alongside a greater emphasis on understanding the value of 
the ocean and a necessity to protect and conserve.5 Proponents of harnessing the ocean’s 
potential for development must now contend with constraints imposed by a growing 
audience canvassing for the protection and responsible use of the ocean. The implied 
tensions are now characteristic of the ongoing oceans debate, which also seeped into 
Phakisa. 
Oceans are subject to multiple pressures to gain access to more sovereign land-
scapes and gain traction for the multiple uses of ocean spaces, infrastructure expansion 
and resource access.6 Goal 14 of the United Nations’ Sustainable Development Goals 
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(SDGs) – Conserve and sustainably use the oceans, seas and marine resources for sus-
tainable development – helps to focus international and national attention on the oceans 
with the sustainability adage a constant and clear conditionality for all.7 Holding polit-
ical and socio-economic value and dire socio-environmental consequences responsible 
for getting it wrong, managing the costs of threats and conflict on and from the sea 
through co-operation or collaboration remains challenging to decision-makers. Interest 
groups nonetheless compete aggressively for access to larger ocean territories in order 
to gain navigation rights, extract resources, and hedge against future uncertainty, but 
now have to demonstrate responsibility, conservation and value for future generations.
Renewed emphasis on oceans as pathways to political economic, environmental 
and social delivery of public goods fosters contrasting perspectives on what the blue 
economy entails. Competitive views frame oceans in opposing ways “as areas of oppor-
tunity, growth and development, as well as threatened and vulnerable spaces in need of 
protection”.8 The use of the concept ‘blue economy’ and its wider international profile 
continues and requires ordering to tone down the tendency to ignore or manipulate its 
deeper sustainability rationale. Integration with social inclusion, environmental sustain-
ability and innovative business models counters reigning thought on crude exploitation 
of the oceans’ economic benefits.9 One attempt to promote understanding flows from 
the UN’s suggested outline of “marine-related economic development that leads to im-
proved human well-being and social equality, while significantly reducing risks to the 
environment”.10 
Silver et al. (2015) move beyond mere endeavours of defining aspects of the blue 
economy to those of adding meaning and practice in different contexts.11 Regarding the 
utility of the oceans, four competing views emerge from their work:12
•	  Oceans as natural capital: The benefits vested in the ocean’s natural infra-
structure and biodiversity of the ecosystems of the ocean offer natural solu-
tions with an economic value to be capitalised upon to promote the idea of a 
blue economy.
•	  Oceans as good business: Existing ocean sectors of business must continue, 
but simultaneously be held accountable for their roles through governance, 
marine science and monitoring. Extraction without accountability cannot con-
tinue.
•	  Oceans as integral to Small Island Developing States (SIDS): These entities 
argue that their livelihoods and developmental imperatives are so closely con-
nected to the oceans that any threat to the oceans endangers their existence 
and requires partnerships and funding to pursue their objectives.
•	  Oceans as small-scale fisheries (SSF) livelihood: Accentuating human–
oceans relations, SSF is also about poverty reduction, employment, empower-
ing women and development. For SSF, ocean grabbing through privatisation 
is a threat as the oceans represent the common good, public property and a 
common heritage and not a benefit for the few over the many.
What becomes apparent from attributing meaning to the blue economy is that actors 
ascribe meaning to the concept that often resembles prioritising own interpretations of 
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costs, benefits and interests, but not always captured within the idea of “nature as capi-
tal” and the responsibility to conserve.13 This is an ongoing tension in practices as well 
as continuing debates to uphold responsibility, sustainability and future use of the seas. 
At present, these competing views and practices (both current and future) co-exist with 
each reflecting its own adherents. The underlying tension resides in more immediate 
gain and profit and the holding of a longer view based on sustainability and lower im-
pact upon the oceans for the common good. Caught within these tensions are the SIDS 
and SSF agendas with their almost existential immediate and longer-term interests in 
healthy and productive oceans. 
Optimism about the potential tied up in oceans as good business thus blends with 
concerns about ocean health and the underlying notion of what blue economy practices 
entail. However, balancing the ocean economy as a productive system with environ-
mental and sustainability imperatives keeps the productive elements of the blue econ-
omy in equilibrium.14 Barbesgaard for example refers to the “everyone wins” percep-
tion as opposed to the negative impact of ocean grab on conservation and restoration 
of ocean resources to mitigate climate change that cuts across all aspects promoting 
healthy and productive oceans. As opposed to the well-documented landward drive for 
resources and territory, the same maturity of debates unfortunately does not ring true 
for the oceans.15 The destruction on land caused by the quest for resources to sustain 
growth, prosperity and development is known and well researched. The debate on using 
the oceans as the remaining 70% of the earth’s surface for business purposes holds a 
negative and destructive side for those carving out a livelihood from the oceans.16 
Findlay differentiates between an oceans economy as a phenomenon and a blue 
economy where sustainability is the guiding intelligence. He is of the view that “a 
sustainable (or blue) economy only emerges when economic use is in balance with 
long-term capacity of ocean ecosystems to support this activity and remain resilient and 
healthy”.17 Findlay refers to a number of alternatives to govern the inherent strains with 
specific reference to South Africa’s turn to the oceans economy, namely –
•	 ocean systems monitoring and research;
•	 development of data systems, information and knowledge;
•	 marine spatial planning to mitigate conflict through trade-offs;
•	  creation and efficient management of marine protected areas in line with in-
ternational targets; and
•	 regulation, compliance monitoring and enforcement.
Landward practices of ever-growing extraction with limited or scant responsibili-
ty towards sustainability and environmental damages should not underpin any oceans 
economy model. A balance between profits that support ecological integrity for the ben-
efit of future generations is a simple but critical assumption for understanding what 
the commitment to blue economic thought and practice entails. Exploiting the oceans 
economy and heeding blue economy imperatives form part of a competitive paradigm 
influencing ongoing debates. Governments nonetheless push on with their preferred 
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ideas on exploiting ocean landscapes perceivably under the blue growth–good business 
label of which the oceans leg of Operation Phakisa is one example. Given where South 
Africa now finds itself within the larger debate and its particular oceans use policies 
embedded in Phakisa’s dominant oceans focus, decision-makers and practitioners must 
navigate the trajectory from an oceans economy to a blue economy. 
Disentangling Operation Phakisa
Phakisa’s oceans sector resonates with the oceans as good business, as natural cap-
ital and the interests of small fisheries as reflected under the Oceans Economy Labora-
tory of the overall project. In essence, Phakisa is steeped in the adoption of a cultural 
transfer of a method introduced by Malaysia to expedite elements of economic trans-
formation.18 Contrary to what comments and reporting often reflect, the oceans focus of 
Phakisa is not the sole outcome of this cultural adaption practice. It sits alongside sister 
initiatives to address critical areas of South Africa’s NDP collectively. Health, mining, 
education, the chemical and waste economy, the oceans, biodiversity and agriculture, 
and land reform are parallel constituent elements of Operation Phakisa with delivery 
plans for each.19 
The South African concern with harnessing the ocean economy entails deriving 
socio-economic benefits from safe and secured resource extraction from the 1,5 million 
km2 exclusive economic zone (EEZ). A recent oceans economy and sustainability work-
shop on 10 April 2018 at Wits University in Johannesburg, for example, emphasised 
sustainability and environmental protection in its opening slides. However, the main 
narratives remained centred on the oceans as a business sector for exploitation by way 
of aquaculture, oil and gas extraction, marine transport and manufacturing with marine 
protection services and ocean governance collectively serving as primary delivery ar-
eas.20 Inherently, sustainability, responsibility and the future do not feature as saliently 
as one would expect and point to a more general predisposition that the blue economy 
concept has no explicit standing of its own.
Irrespective of how salient the blue economy features, five criteria underpin the 
selected growth and delivery areas in the Operation Phakisa Ocean Economy Initiative. 
These criteria point the potential contributions of the said delivery areas to the gross 
domestic product (GDP) and job creation, relevance to the marine eco system, geo-po-
litical, security and environmental implications, institutional and logistical capacity 
requirements for the growth area followed by novelty.21 Of importance and probably 
indicative of a concern with not failing to capture maritime potential and opportunities 
on offer, industry, civil society, academia and labour collaborate to operationalise the 
four delivery areas. In a way, South Africa’s government views Phakisa’s oceans sector 
as a problem-solving initiative to address regression in socio-economic growth, service 
delivery and uplifting society. The latter feeds back into how the oceans serve as a ‘new’ 
landscape to enhance inclusive growth and development, but in a manner that guaran-
tees sustainable ocean landscapes.22 Phakisa’s oceans initiatives now reside between 
two sets of pressure: 
92
South African Journal of Military Studies
•	  first, promises and premises pledging quick results and growth from accessing 
the ocean economy through oceans grab and competitive exploitation; and
•	  second, the responsible sustainable use of the ocean vested in the blue econ-
omy rationale suggests a longer-term and more precarious way of tying the 
country’s oceans into the NDP for growth and development. 
The first seems prominent and leading the way; the latter more declaratory and less 
prominent than one would expect, but bringing the oceans economy into the overall 
economic fold is now a new South African reality.
The road map for 203023 shows a number of goal posts for South Africa’s envisaged 
future maritime standing. Each goal has a Phakisa oceans economy footprint framed 
by progress up to date. The objectives tie in with core ideas of securing the oceans 
landscape for Phakisa and in a way harbour elements of maintaining a blue econo-
my and fostering international recognition.24 While the safety and security narrative is 
explicit, the security of the environment and future use and sustainability feature less 
prominent, and this is a concern. Buzan (1991)25 points to the difficulty of securitising 
environmental security as an existential threat, and in 2019, Bueger again picked up on 
the environmental debate as “the forgotten dimension” with reference to the oceans.26 
In essence, the entrapment is one of convincing decision-makers that environmental 
threats are on a par with military, economic and political threats with the latter still being 
deemed existential and familiar in terms of understanding and responses than. Taking 
this to the oceans security debate could well hold difficulties of its own. It remains to be 
seen whether South Africa has bridged the divide to bring environmental concerns fully 
into the Phakisa fold to step more fully into the blue economy debate.
The connection between Phakisa, safety and security, and South Africa’s 2030 
maritime roadmap finds expression in normative linkages indicated in the road map’s 
high-level objectives:27
•	  Objective 2. We have an enabling governance framework for the maritime 
sector by closing down jurisdictional gaps in law, protection enforcement and 
prosecution.
•	  Objective 4. We utilise our resources sustainably and protect our natural re-
sources in the EEZ by research-driven conservation of marine resources and 
reducing pollution levels.
•	  We have national, regional and international presence and recognition to 
strengthen South Africa’s position in the international maritime space.28
•	  Objective 7. We prioritise safety and security and military protection with-
in and beyond our EEZ through innovative opportunities, collaboration with 
Africa, investing in safety and security, maintaining safety and security stan-
dards, technologies and research to promote safety and security.
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A blue economic future: Raising the threshold for Phakisa
The rush to share in the economic potential of the oceans implies keeping in step 
with competitors who hold similar aspirations. Overall, one finds a propensity for some 
power grab to control marine resources for global objectives of feeding growing pop-
ulations featuring alongside poverty reduction to ulterior motives claiming to save the 
environment.29 Smaller debates feature on how ocean-related economic and environ-
mental matters compete with ‘blue grabbing’, which potentially mitigates interests and 
rights of people. Capital growth still comes first and in the ensuing competition, ecolog-
ical and social costs suffer.
Emerging research on blue growth and social impact is not yet widely known and/or 
convincing. Extraction and exploitation drives directed by own interests still appear to 
outmanoeuvre climate and conservation matters.30 A win-win reality remains uncertain 
for climate investors and coastal communities as blue growth drives remain contested 
and exposed to trade-offs between capital for blue growth and that of unsustainable 
practices driven by big business and profits. Claims of a commitment to a blue economy 
require additional understanding of what is at stake. Engaging in an oceans economy 
founded on blue principles supposes different pathways demonstrating a greater respon-
sibility to invest in the sustainability with a strong consensus on protecting the future.
South Africa shows a well-articulated commitment to develop its oceans economy. 
Turning to the imperatives of a blue economy, the latter is not explicit in South Africa’s 
focus on the oceans economy. A search for blue economic commitments in Phakisa-re-
lated documents uncovers the absence of an overt blue economic rationale in the oceans 
leg of Phakisa. The following documents and reports on Phakisa lack explicit commit-
ment or references to the pursuit of blue economic principles or practices:31
•	  the presidential address in Durban at the launch of Operation Phakisa dated 
15 October 2014;
•	  the earlier-mentioned maritime road map (2016) to position South Africa as a 
recognised international maritime player by 2033;
•	 the Oceans economy Review Workshop of 15 October 2015;
•	  Operation Phakisa – ‘Unlocking the oceans economy through aquaculture’ 
dated October 2016; 
•	  Operation Phakisa on South Africa’s oceans economy in its advertising of 
facilities and capacities of South Africa as the top oceans economy on the 
African continent;
•	  Portfolio Committee Briefing: Feedback by the Department of Agriculture, 
Forestry and Fisheries (DAFF) on aquaculture of Operation Phakisa oceans 
economy dated 24 October 2017;
•	 Phakisa’s Oceans Economy Summary Report dated September 2017; and
•	  An oceans economy and sustainability workshop (10 April 2018) although the 
workshop title suggested sustainability as the focus.
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The collective drive to harness South Africa’s ocean landscape and direct its eco-
nomic potential towards better governance and supply of quality public goods to society 
is encouraging and on the surface well mapped, structured and located at the highest 
political office.32 While the absence of explicit blue economy commitments remains an 
element of concern, the oceans sector of Phakisa continues to grow with 2019 being the 
time marker for a next review on progress and stasis by the Office for Programming, 
Monitoring and Evaluation in the Presidency.
Overall progress with Phakisa’s oceans economy leg
The Department for Planning Monitoring and Evaluation (DPME) in the Presidency 
updates progress on Operation Phakisa with government departments and agencies re-
sponsible for different sectors of Phakisa’s oceans leg. Departments of Transport, Min-
erals and Energy, Environmental Affairs and Agriculture, Fisheries and Forestry feature 
prominently, with the Departments of Defence and Safety and Security less prominent, 
but not unimportant. The latest updates show detail within the different initiatives as 
reported by March 2019. It is unclear whether the progress in fact reflects 2019 data, but 
from the available information one can discern progress and stasis. 
Table 1. Progress report on Phakisa’s oceans leg33
Work stream Focus area  activities % completed % on time completions
Aquaculture 1 742 37 18
Offshore oil and gas 288 97 20
Marine protection and governance 275 72 85
Marine transport and manufacturing 308 20 20
Coastal and marine tourism 117 32 32
Table 2. On marine protection and governance progress34
Initiative Due  activities
% completion of due 
activities
Accelerate capacity building 34 15
Enhance coordinated enforcement 56 89
Establish coastal information system for management 39 87
Oceans and coastal pollution monitoring 35 71
Marine Protected Area (MPA) representative network 25 80
MPA/Marine Spatial Planning (MSP) discovery, research and 
monitoring programme 30 57
Marine spatial planning 56 84
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Tables 1 and 2 above indicate that the working streams (other than marine protection 
and governance, and oil and gas) are less successful although Pretorius reported in 2017 
that, at the time, the oil and gas working stream was more successful than the rest.35 
Overall, the results in 2017 and the early data reported for 2019 both portray two suc-
cessful working streams that do not augur well for Phakisa as a delivery mechanism for 
big and fast results in support of the NDP.
Security first: Reviewing safety and security indicators for South Africa’s coastal 
waters
Phakisa’s oceans sector requires a stable governance setting to fortify the explora-
tion and utilisation of minerals, aquaculture, marine protection areas as well as foster-
ing maritime commerce and manufacturing. South Africa’s current maritime security 
governance profile appears to be stable given the perceived absence of piracy, robbery 
and attacks on vessels at sea or in anchorages. However, the scope of developments and 
contributions from ocean activities calls for closer scrutiny. A successful ocean-based 
economy rests upon safety and security, infrastructure, and dense but secured multi-use 
of marine and maritime resources all of which attract legitimate and illegitimate state 
and non-state actors in what Shemella calls the maritime violence ecosystem.36 Attrac-
tive and growing economic opportunities in coastal zones (on and offshore) reinforce 
domestic and international migration patterns of people, business and related industries 
but unfortunately local, national and transnational criminal actors as well. Crimes with 
maritime tentacles grow with robberies at sea, human smuggling, stowaways, narcotics, 
black market activities, and international crime networks entering the landscape. 
The Ibrahim Index on African Governance (IIAG) and the Stable Seas Index (SSI) 
offer a more nuanced outlook on the security landscape within which Phakisa resides. 
The IIAG sets South Africa’s 2019 Landward Safety and Rule of Law count at 66,7/100. 
The count stems from indicators on Rule of Law (90,2), Transparency and Account-
ability (57,4), Personal Safety (33,5) and National Security (85,7). Overall governance 
for South Africa stands at 68/100 with Participation and Human Rights, Sustainable 
Economic Opportunity and Human Development being the other three measurement 
categories.
As for the focus upon economics – the IIAG reports as follows for South Africa. 
Overall, 65,1/100, and for the constituent indicators the counts are: Public Management 
62,6 and Rising; Business Environment 67,6, but deteriorating; Infrastructure at 65,9 
and slowing down and deteriorating, and the Rural Sector at 64,1 and bouncing back. 
The economic indicators appear average to good. Adding a successful and well-gov-
erned oceans economy to the mix could well foster even better economic prospects. 
When compared with the Stable Seas Index37 for South Africa’s overall 2019 maritime 
security governance, the count stands at 66/100, underpinned by the following counts:
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Table 3. SSI counts for South Africa 
International co-operation 94





(Absence of) piracy 100
Illicit trade 44
Illegal mixed migration 74
Both indexes portray counts that support arguments for a relatively stable securi-
ty environment to pursue marine and maritime-related objectives. The stability counts 
support the premise that a stable safety and security environment on land and at sea per-
mits the pursuit of viable and constructive political, economic and social agendas.38 The 
same premise applies for pursuing such agendas at sea.39 For South Africa, landward 
security as it now stands, is not a key catalyst for insecurity at sea.
The safety and security conditionality portray concerns for South Africa’s oceans 
initiative to bring its oceans economy to fruition. Although political expectations for 
Phakisa regarding growth, job creation and gross national product (GNP) contributions 
are optimistic, not all indicators support the optimism.40 Transparency and accountabil-
ity as well as personal safety and security indicators of the IIAG for South Africa show 
average counts. Deeper exploration of each highlight uncovers more concerns. Accord-
ing to the IIAG, Rule of Law is deteriorating, so is transparency and accountability. 
Personal safety achieved low and weakening counts. Only national security indicators 
in the IIAG show an improving trend. 
Not all SSI counts augur well for Phakisa. For the blue economy, the absence of 
oceanic oil and gas discoveries is a major detractor given the disappointing progress 
in adding local oil and gas to its blue economy mix. On a positive note, Total’s 2019 
discovery of significant gas deposits south of Mossel Bay may alter this variable given 
a potential one billion barrels of wet gas.. The Total discovery could be a game changer 
in the country’s oceans economy that suffers from the absence of energy-based contri-
butions to the mix.41 The tourism count is average, and is suppressed by a perceived 
tourism–climate change nexus impacted by doubt about South Africa’s capacity to deal 
with climate change while crime levels on land add to lower tourist counts. Illicit trade 
in South African waters portrays negative counts informed by unsatisfactory countering 
of smuggling in wildlife and black market pharmaceuticals. Maritime enforcement falls 
victim to the imbalance between territorial size, coastline length and assets in order 
to police such a large geographic maritime territory. For mixed migration, maritime 
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trafficking in young men gang-pressed into the fishing industry is a concern and mili-
tates against the encouraging counts of other indicators. As for stowaways, Protection 
& Indemnity insurers for example flagged South Africa (Durban in particular) as high 
risk with a growing and disturbing number of stowaways found.42 Collectively, enforce-
ment, illicit trade, migration and stowaways highlight security governance, or some 
voids in the overall governance architecture.
Environmental concerns: Prioritising environmental governance in support of 
maritime security
Environmental sustainability dovetailing with stakeholder interests is vital to pro-
mote a healthy and productive ocean ecosystem. Practices that do not conform to the 
blue and green economy concepts promote uncertainty about sustainable and respon-
sible extraction of living and non-living resources. National interests driven by oceans 
grab, the oceans as business, and capital open for exploitation by all sit uncomfortably 
alongside responsibility, conservation and restoration of ocean resources as underlying 
notions of a sustainable economy. South Africa must heed the international shift in how 
to harness the full potential contained in the country’s marine-based economy, but in a 
responsible and sustainable manner. Bringing in sustainability and responsibility envis-
ages:43
•	 social and economic benefits for future generations;
•	  restoring, protecting and maintaining natural capital vested in ocean land-
scapes; and
•	 clean technologies, renewable energy and circular economy principles.
The task of developing an overarching, integrated ocean governance framework for 
the sustainable growth of the ocean economy falls under the Marine Protection Services 
and Ocean Governance working streams. Several initiatives were set out and eventually 
achieved, albeit not all on time, or in progress:44
•	  Development and implementation of an overarching governance plan by 
March 2015. The plan entails the protection of the ocean environment 
against illegal activities and to promote its multiple socio-economic benefits 
with results by 2017.
•	  The delivery of a National Marine Spatial Planning Framework in order to 
enable a sustainable ocean economy by December 2015.
•	  Progress on working towards an Oceans Act and a draft Oceans Bill in 2015. 
The Oceans Act will provide a clear foundation for marine spatial planning.
Turning to the economic value chain of the oceans, Phakisa’s architects in fact claim 
to promote responsible and sustainable ocean use as opposed to unmitigated and de-
structive ocean exploitation.45 This stands in contrast to the “brown business as usual 
model”46 of free extraction and waste dumping without due consideration of its impact. 
With the South African Department of Environmental Affairs (DEA) as the lead de-
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partment for security and governance within the maritime leg of the Operation Phakisa 
programme, a symbolic emphasis on concerns with environmental caution appears to 
have taken root. Findlay, however notes that the delivery areas still resort under their 
functional government departments.47 This risks dysfunctional national departments, 
interdepartmental tensions and eventually neglect and/or ignorance of the objectives to 
sustain growth and to maximise socio-economic benefits and environmental protection 
at sea. Crucial to environmental concerns are matters that endanger or pressure no-
tions of prevention, sustainability, healthy productive oceans and preserving the oceans 
for future generations. The latter requires operational governance capacities to enforce 
sustainability and environmental protection. This is perhaps the single most important 
vulnerability in terms of not moving from statements of intent to actions.
Policy documents commit state departments and agencies of Phakisa to the environ-
ment–sustainability nexus through the National Framework for Marine Spatial Planning 
in South Africa (of 26 May 2017), and Marine Protected Areas (MPAs) with 22 MPAs 
set out under Phakisa’s MPA network. The MPAs entail a holistic approach to lower 
the impact of industrialisation of the ocean and not only conservation of fish and other 
living organisms. The MPAs do not provide for some critically endangered species, 
although they hold indirect advantages related to tourism, social upliftment, education 
and cultural as well as historic preservation. A further concern is weak enforcement and 
governance in terms of ensuring environmental protection and its sustainability nexus.48 
Uncertainty remains whether the practical execution conforms to the blue concept as the 
review workshop document of 15 October 2015, for example, reflects no reference to 
sustainability in the execution of the Phakisa programmes, neither does the presidential 
feedback of 8 April 2016. Both report on hard challenges of infrastructure progress, 
outputs and investments that accentuate the oceans as good business akin to oceans gr-
ab.49 This casts uncertainty over the aquaculture, offshore oil and gas, marine protection 
and governance, marine transport and manufacturing, coastal and marine tourism, small 
harbour and coastal land development sectors residing within the oceans economy lab 
of Operation Phakisa with the state departments mentioned earlier as the responsible 
executing agencies.
Government’s fixation with extraction from and transport via its ocean lines of com-
munication contradicts declaratory commitments to protect the environment.50 Environ-
mental protection is the difficult ambit of using the oceans for wealth creation and pub-
lic service delivery. Lowering of standards to protect the environment does little to instil 
confidence that Phakisa’s oceans focus prioritises environmental concerns.51 It is not 
geographically defined or containable within the national ambit to prevent or control, 
but rather networked into international co-operation and thus partially in the foreign 
policy field. Similarly, global trade, lower Foreign Direct Investment, glut of shipping 
capital, and commodity price volatility all influence and make for uncertainty about the 
predicted success of Phakisa’s oceans economy. In essence, the pace and projections of 
what the turn to offshore assets offers to grow the economy and address socio-economic 
threats and vulnerabilities, are set within an international system that too often opposes 
Phakisa’s imposed optimism.
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Finally, Phakisa’s oceans focus faces growing resistance to exploiting natural cap-
ital as contained in the ocean’s resources and inherent natural contributions to regulate 
climate. Short-term economic and political gains under the banner of growth and ser-
vice delivery have to contend with growing societal opposition to encroachment upon 
environmental concerns.52 Mineral exports through shipping and oil and gas extraction 
underpin Phakisa’s success, but these sectors operate under conditions of uncertainty 
and increasing environmental scrutiny. Unfolding corruption and state capture revela-
tions involved in megaprojects, such as Phakisa, are a real and dangerous concern with 
Southwell describing this as pollution of South African politics and the seas.53 It remains 
to be seen whether Phakisa escapes the vast state capture and corruption networks now 
being uncovered by the Zondo, Nugent and Mpati Commissions of Inquiry.
Capacity to maintain the rule of law
Shemella distinguishes between capability and capacity where the former supposes 
an entity or agency is able to do something once, while capacity supposes employment 
of a certain capability in a repeated and consistent manner over time to achieve a set out-
come.54 The capacity to extend maritime security governance entails a comprehensive 
set of activities to root out or mitigate even minor transgressions at sea alongside ma-
jor threats from terrorism, piracy and transnational crime syndicates. Particular threats 
listed by Phakisa’s marine protection and governance leg are marine protected species 
in MPAs, illegal fishing, prevention of and combatting pollution, piracy and human 
trafficking, effluence discharge and waste dumping at sea.55 
The South African Police Service (SAPS) has a sea border unit, but one almost 
devoid of capability or capacity to operate beyond South African harbours in spite of its 
obligation to police territorial waters up to 12 nautical miles (nm). By February 2018, 
SAPS still had no operational sea-going capability to deal with threats from the sea 
within its area of responsibility and through its sea border unit beyond proposals on how 
to police harbours – small harbours in particular. Fact remains that any threat from the 
sea beyond harbours had become the de facto responsibility of DAFF with one offshore 
and three inshore protection vessels dedicated to fisheries protection and vessels of the 
SA Navy.56 Leaving aside some progress in acquiring new navy vessels for inshore pa-
trolling and hydrographic services, no credible capacity-building programme is visible 
to support Phakisa’s oceans leg at sea with enforcement.57 
Physical prevention and enforcement must align with governance through oversight 
of how departments execute policies and implement strategic plans. Several depart-
ments are involved in the different growth and delivery areas presuming departmen-
tal oversight, including parliamentary oversight. South Africa’s political governance 
is currently entwined in clientism, corruption, mistrust and ad hoc arrangements that 
cloud the turn to an oceans economy – which is firstly a political project of the ANC 
government.58 The Departments of Agriculture, Forestry and Fisheries,59 of Minerals 
and Energy, of Transport, of Environmental Affairs and of Defence and Police all con-
stitute responsible departments within the Phakisa ocean economy leg that resort un-
der oversight committees of the SA parliament. All are monitored as Phakisa cannot 
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proceed unchecked and override caution for the sake of commercial exploitation. One 
perception that remains is that Phakisa’s oceans drive is about corporate profits to the 
detriment of people, the environment and sustainability, and possibly already a victim 
of state capture60
Mapping progress and stasis in Phakisa’s oceans sector
Turning to the oceans as demonstrated by Phakisa’s oceans programme is encour-
aging. Supported by a roadmap leading towards 2030 to position South Africa as an in-
ternationally recognised maritime player, this augurs well for the future. Both initiatives 
set the country within the oceans debate and imply that South African decision-makers 
must negotiate the interplay between international dialogue and practical service deliv-
ery to its citizens.61 In essence, this is about thinking about a different problem setting, 
which includes mastering ocean debates and practical contributions, ways to adjust ex-
isting structures and collaborate with multiple stakeholders to turn from declaratory 
statements to operational matters, and ultimately outputs as service delivery of public 
goods. 
In spite of criticism, the oceans focus continues, and Phakisa draws in initiatives 
that prefer to be associated with Phakisa. As a conceptual umbrella, Phakisa’s oceans 
programme stimulates a latent economic landscape with much potential, but it is weak-
ly utilised, regulated and protected. It is thus a question of whether the South African 
government can unlock the ocean’s potential by negotiating the required partnerships, 
bureaucratic obstacles and reigning political weaknesses of questionable governance ar-
chitecture. International engagement is key and explicitly mentioned in the 2018–2019 
Strategic Plan of the Department of International Relations and Cooperation (DIRCO) 
to engage international partners in the furtherance of the oceans economy.62 A simul-
taneous requirement stems from setting up local public–private partnerships (PPPs) to 
augment the narrow government and semi-state profile of Phakisa’s current approach to 
unlock the country’s oceans economy.
As a normative framework, Phakisa’s oceans focus is inclusive and maps out clear 
outcomes.63 From the outset, government cultivated active participation by diverse 
actors – government, non-governmental, industry and academia – to bring about the 
attributes of clustered governance.64 Declared but questioned support by a secretari-
at and inter-ministerial committee promises to consolidate management as opposed to 
scattered or fragmented management of individual departments.65 While the presidency 
reports on progress and departments concentrate on their designated delivery areas, the 
inter-ministerial committee consolidates the overall effort as a vertical conduit for the 
national departments and their agencies. Phakisa also advances human capacity devel-
opment, job creation, research, technology and innovation that collectively hold poten-
tial to promote ocean governance.66 
On a more cautionary note, big, fast results from South Africa’s drive to bring its 
oceans economy into line, are not running smoothly. First, a general analysis questions 
the use of the the Malaysian model as it does not translate to a good fit. Upon closer 
scrutiny, the designated governance modes of efficiency presumed by the Malaysian 
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model diverge from South Africa’s governance sector, which is increasingly character-
ised by corruption, and personalised institutional ravages taking their toll. Governance 
structures have become ineffective in too many critical areas related to Phakisa’s depart-
mental-based oceans sector to set in place capable steering committees and overcome 
legislative obstructions.67 The extent to which Phakisa rests on big, fast results through a 
competent public sector, South Africa’s failing public governance is of great concern.68
Slow policy development, a lack of leadership, weak institutional arrangements, 
and weak stakeholder communications could well weaken interest in the Phakisa proj-
ect. This is supported by limited progress in all the areas with the oil and gas working 
stream perhaps the exception. Slow progress with aquaculture, protection and gover-
nance, transport and manufacturing makes for pessimism, given their limited or less 
than encouraging on-time achievement of their objectives.69 Together with political and 
extensive bureaucratic problems, Phakisa could well render an unattractive business 
environment for local and international private partnerships, particularly the absence 
of integrating Phakisa more aggressively into foreign policy initiatives. Developing a 
secure and growing oceans economy requires public–private ventures at home and with 
international business entities, as well as governments, elements still showing room for 
improvement within the Phakisa ambit.70 Their absence points to a probable loss of con-
fidence in working with South Africa in general and within the oceans economic sector 
in particular. Underlying this is the failure of South African government departments 
and bureaucrats to attract and orchestrate such co-operation in the upcoming field of 
oceans governance and the blue economy to interface the country’s oceans economy 
more fully with the country’s landward economic fabric.
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